CAROL: **C**ertifi**a**bly **Ro**bust Reinforcement Learning through Model-Based Abstract Interpretation

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Background: RL in Safety-Critical Tasks

- Reinforcement learning (RL) is an established approach for various tasks, including safety-critical ones.



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Dense reinforcement learning for safety validation of autonomous vehicles

Shuo Feng, Haowei Sun, Xintao Yan, Haojie Zhu, Zhengxia Zou, Shengyin Shen & Henry X. Liu 🖾

Nature 615, 620–627 (2023) | Cite this article

- State-of-the-art RL methods use neural networks as policy representations.

Background: RL with Neural Network Policies is Vulnerable

Neural networks are vulnerable.







 \boldsymbol{x}

"panda" 57.7% confidence "nematode" 8.2% confidence $m{x} + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(
abla_{m{x}} J(m{ heta}, m{x}, y))$ "gibbon" 99.3 % confidence

[1] Goodfellow et, al. Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples. ICLR 2015.

Background: RL with Neural Network Policies is Vulnerable

Problems are more severe in RL as mistakes can cascade.

A hopper moves forward



Under attacks



Background: Certified Defenses

Certified Neural Networks in Supervised Learning DiffAI (Mirman et al. 18), k-ReLU (Singh et al. 19), RNN Verification (Ryou et al. 21) Defenses are still heuristic in RL SA (Zhang et al. 20), PA-AD (Sun et al. 22), RADIAL (Oikarinen et al. 21)

Heuristic defenses are defeated by **counter** attacks.

Can we train a certifiable RL policy against arbitrary attacks?

Goal: Train Certifiable Robust Reinforcement Learning Policies



Challenges

 How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?

We use abstract interpretation, covering all the attacks.

 How to reason over the black-box environment?

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How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?

We use abstract interpretation, covering all the attacks.

 How to reason over the black-box environment?

[1] Cousot et, al. Abstract Interpretation. POPL 1977.

[2] Mirman et, al. Differentiable Abstract Interpretation for Provably Robust Neural Networks. ICML 2018.

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Challenges

 How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?

We use abstract interpretation, covering all the attacks.

 How to reason over the black-box environment?

Learn a white-box transition representation of the environment with the policy.



Step 1: Train a NN represented **model** (verifiable) for the black-box environment during normal training.



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Step 1: Train a NN represented model (verifiable) for the black-box environment during normal training. Step 2: Train the policy over the NN model of the real environment. Step 3: A symbolic RL algorithm: **RL[#]**: with the learnt symbolic reward R[#]. **Step 4**: In each iteration: we use the accumulative reward lower bound to guide the training: $\hat{R^{\#}}$ = LowerBound[RL[#](A[#], O[#],

R[#])]

Theoretical Bound of Reward

With probability 1 - δ , the reward (R) under the worst attack is bounded by,

$$R \geq {\hat{R}}^{\#} - rac{1}{\sqrt{\delta}} \sqrt{rac{Var[R^{\#}]}{N}} - \left(1 - (1 - \delta_E)^T
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- The bound grows as the δ shrinks.
 ⇒ We pay the price of a looser bound as we consider higher confidence levels.
- The bound depends on Var[R[#]] and N in an intuitive way.
 ⇒ Higher variance makes it harder to measure the true reward, more samples make the bound tighter.
- 3. As δ_E increases, the last term grows. \Rightarrow A less accurate environment model leads to a looser bound.
- 4. The bound grows with T.
 - ⇒ Over longer time horizons, our reward measurement gets less accurate.

Reward Bound under Worst-case Attack

Time Horizon (T)



Reward Bound under Worst-case Attack

RL without Defense

Time Horizon (T)







Summary: CAROL

CAROL: Certifiable Robust Reinforcement Learning with Long-Horizon Reward Bound

Key Idea: Abstract Interpretation for **Verification** in the Learning Loop **White-Box** Environment Representation Learning



Code: https://github.com/chenxi-yang/carol

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Future: More Accurate and Scalable Certified RL

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Backup Materials

Model Error



Bound Tightness



Certifiable Bound Physical Meaning

